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III Major Markets of Japan 
1. Trade between Japan and U. S. A. 
(I) Structure of Export towards U. S. A. 
Until the middle of the 1950's, the Japanese export towards U. S. A. was mainly com-
posed of textile and miscellaneous goods, with light machinery which is durable consumer 
goods playing a secondary role, and they as a whole were characterized by lahor-intensive 
goods manufactured in smaller businesses. The share of U. S. A. in the export market was 
small compared with that of Southeast Asia (see Table 15"). On the other hand, the im-
port took the form of agricultural products (cotton, wheat), industrial materials and capital 
goods (machinery). This corresponds to the stage in which native industry or light industry 
was being recovered, established and transformed into an export industry, and with this as 
a medium the protection of domestic market for heavy and chemical industry as well as 
concurrent intrusion into the Southeastern Asian markets was undertaken, which provided 
III Professor. 
1) Ono, K., "Japanese Capitalism and Foreign Trade 1945-1970" (I), The Kyoto University Economic 
Review, Vol. 47, No. 1-2, Apr.-Oct. 1977, p. 47. 
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Japan with a foothold to pursue the basic proc ess towards the establishment of heavy and 
chemical industry. However, since the end of the 1950's the export of light machinery 
(transistor radios, sewing machines, binoculars, cameras) composed mainly of household 
electric appliances increased by leaps, and since 1963-1964 with the increase of the export 
of iron and steel and heavy machinery the importance of capital-intensive goods was 
gradually enhanced. This also indicated the shift of the importance in the export towards 
U. S. A. from former goods manufactured by smaller enterprises to those by larger enter-
prises, or the change of the trade structure in this aspect. Nevertheless, what characterized 
the Japanese industries are the fact that the goods manufactured by larger enterprises de-
pended to a great extent on the utilization of extraordinary workers or on smaller subcon-
tract enterprises. 
Japanese export towards U. S. A. showed an annual average increase of 17% for the 
period of 1960-1965 and 24.8% for 1966-1971, which figures exceeded the increase of the 
total export, respectively of 15.8% and 19% in the same periods, with greater importance 
of U. S. A. in the Japanese export. The mainstay in such an increase of export towards 
U. S. A. was the remarkable increase in export of heavy and chemical industrial products, 
above all, machinery and instruments, which replaced the stagnation of traditional export 
of textile and miscellaneous goods and so on. The percentage of heavy and chemical in-
dustrial products in export towards U. S. A. was 75.5% in 1971 and this figure exceeded 
74.6% being ratio of heavy and chemical industrialization of total export. The Japanese 
share in the U. S. A. import increased from 4.7% for 1956-1958 to 13.5% for 1968-1970 
and to 15.9% in 1971, and ranked the second next to Canada. However, the increase of 
export towards U. S. A. of machinery and instruments depended on only a few varieties of 
durable consumer goods. 
Now let us look back the past hundred years of the world trade. For a start the 
world trade where textile had been dominant underwent a transformation with the advent 
of iron and steel, railway and shipbuilding, and then it has developed into automobiles and 
electric appliances and machine products of big industry of twentieth century from inventions 
and product-development in the end of previous century. Such a change has also con-
tinued after the World War II, for example, in electronic instruments, petrochemistry, and 
plastics. 
Since the beginning of this century the change has brought a continued increase of 
the share in the world trade in the three major fields, i. e., machines, transportation ma-
chines and instruments and chemical goods. As aforementioned, the Japanese export to-
wards U. S. A. intended to equalize or horizontalize to a level which these developed 
countries had already attained. Therefore, Japan had to newly entry in the existing fields 
of industry as a new comer. Whether iron and steel or shipbuilding, the leading commodities 
of the Japanese postwar export was in heavy industry, traditional of Europe and U. S. A. 
It was a pursuit after industries which had become relatively inferior, based on low 
wages: and was a process of seizing its share in the world market. Introduction of larger-
sized equipment units, pursuit to the international standard, increase of capital equipment 
ratio per capita (even though it was through the introduced techniques) and increase of 
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labor productivity thereby will be fulfilled, it will be self-evident that relatively low wages 
should result in further decrease of wage costs, thus leading to a strengthening of the 
international competitive power. Current export of labor-intensive light machinery mainly 
composed of household electric appliances is not free from such a characteristic. More-
over, the problem is that the export tends to enlarge with an explosive increase of export 
of a few varieties of leading commodities, with the degree of concentration for the largest 
ten items being 60%. 
It must also be noted that these growth-leading industries for Japan depend very 
highly on U. S. A. (Tables IS-A, B, C). 
However, this does not bear witness to the frailty of the international competitive 
power of Japan (readers may be reminded of the Japanese cotton industry which was 
successful in defeating Lancashire cotton industry in the past). Nevertheless, we must point 
out that it tends to invite frictions with the existing markets and that it has such a struc-
ture as will give rise to antagonism because of protective policies of the other countrie,. 
Wide-ranged self-regulation or strengthened control of dumping is an expression of the 
Table IS-A. Transition of Structure of Export to U. S. A. 
(Unit: 'Yo) 
1956-1964 , I 1965-1971 
I 
Total I 100.0 100.0 
! 
Foodstuffs I 7.3 2.3 
, 
Textiles 23.3 10.9 
Clothing 8.4 4.5 
Chemical goods 1.8 2.4 
Non-metallic materials 6. I 2. 7 
Ceramics 3.0 1.5 
Metals and metallic products 16.7 21. 3 
Iron and steel I 9.5 15.2 
Metallic products 5.8 5.0 
Machines 19.7 46.9 
Television sets 0.8 5. I 
Radio sets 5. I 4. 7 
Automobiles 0.5 10.4 
Motorcycles 1.0 4.6 






, 25.0 13.5 






Heavy and chemical industrial products 
I 
38.3 ! 70.6 
Light industrial products 
I 
54.4 I 27. 1 
Miscellaneous 7.3 I 2.3. ! 
The Bank of Japan, Mon,hly Bull,',n (m Japanese), Oct. 1972. 
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Table IS-B. Degree of Dependence on U. S. A. 
of Major Product Export (1968) 
(Unit: 'Yo) 
Table IS-C. Share of japanese Major Products 
in the Import of U. S. A. (1971) 
(Unit: %) 
Commodities 
Heavy and chemical industrial productsl 
Machines and instruments 
Television sets 
Transistor radio sets 
Tape-recorders 
Automobiles (ex. parts) 
Metallic goods 
Iron and steel 
Chemical goods 
Light industrial products 
Textiles 
Non-metallic mineral products 













46 .. 3 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
The White Paper on Trade and Commerce (in 
japanese), 1969, p. 97. 
Items 
Cotton and synthetic fabric thread 23.5 
Cotton textiles 21. 8 
Synthetic fiber textiles 64. 7 
Ceramics 59.9 
Steel, plate 43.2 
Steel pipes and joints 57.3 
Business instruments 37.4 
Television sets 77.7 
Radio sets 65.9 
Passenger cars 18.8 
Motorcycles 82.8 
Clothing 21. 9 
Cameras 76.4 
Tape-recorders 81. 0 
Miscellaneous goods 20. I 
The Bank of japan, Monthly Bulletin (in 
japanese), Oct. 1972. 




share in imEort I Share of other countries in import 
Total import 1965 11. 3 Canada 22.6 Great Britain 6.6 
71 15.9 Canada 28.0 West Germany 8.0 
Clothing 1965 35.1 Hong Kong 27. 7 Great Britain 4.0 
71 22.0 Hong Kong 28.3 The Republic of Korea 12.9 
Plywoods 1965 40.4 , Formosa 15.8 Philippines 14.5 
71 20. 7 The Republic 
of Korea 37. 1 Formosa 21. 6 
Toys, dolls 1965 53. 1 Hong Kong 23. I Great Britain 6. 7 
71 29.5 Hong Kong 34.8 Mexico 9.3 
Footwears 1965 81. 7 The Republic 
of Korea 5.9 Hong Kong 2.8 
71 33.3 Formosa 30. 7 Italy 13.9 
Umbrellas and 1965 75.3 Hong Kong 18.3 Italy 4.0 parasols 
71 42.6 Hong Kong 26.8 Formosa 21. 4 
jETRO, The White Paper on Overseas Markets (in Japanese); referred from Monthly Bulletin 
oj Financial Statistics (in Japanese), No. 251. 
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above. This is also the reason why U. S. A. urges Japan to liberalize the import of supe-
rior and highly technical products, i. e., electronic computers, of which U. S. A. is proud, 
as well as some agricultural products. 
In addition, export of machinery mainly composed of durable consumer goods can not 
help being affected by the fluctuation of disposable personal income which is connected 
with the American business trend. Moreover, besides the competition with Europe in the 
American market, export of textile and miscellaneous goods, which still accounts for 25% 
of the total export towards U. S. A., has already faced the attack from developing coun-
tries with greater intensity and the possibility of such an intense attack is now enlarging 
(refer to Table 19). It can be said that traditional commodities themselves, which used to 
be in comparative advantageous position, are now facing a crisis. At the same time, this 
will indicate that the Japanese capital export will tend to the export industries of these 
developing countries towards developed countries, and this tendency will enlarge such a 
direction or domination over these export industries. The rapid increase of export in 1971, 
though it was supported on one side by the temporary factors of intensify inflation and of 
adjusting foreign exchange (in expectation of devaluating dollar) in U. S. A., and even 
rather aggravated friction and contradiction. 
(2) Structure of Import from U. S. A. 
Now let us study the import. As Table 20 shows the structure of import from U. S. A., 
since 1965 the import of textile materials has decreased, while that of foodstuffs and of 
machinery has increased. As a whole, the import of agricultural products and of industrial 









Fabric raw materials I 10.6 2.9 
Raw metallic materials I 12.5 6.0 
Other raw materials 18.4 22.0 
Soy beans 6.4 7. I 
Lumber 3.0 8.6 




Crude oil 0.4 0.2 
Petroleum products ! 4.4 2. 1 , 






Non-ferrous metals 1.7 1.6 
Total 
I 
100.0 ! 100.0 
Raw fuels 52.4 
I 
42. g 
The Bank of Japan, Monthly Bulletin (in Japanese). 
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materials accounts approximately for 60% of the total import from U. S. A. Japan not 
only depends on U. S. A. for almost all the industrial materials except wool but even for 
agricultural fodder, so that agricultural materials which will support agriculture. This is the 
characteristic of the postwar period different from the prewar period. The aforementioned 
rapid decrease in the ratio of food self-supply of Japan since 1960 was clearly a conse-
quence of the above (the ratio of food self-supply calculated on the carolie basis decreas-
ed from 83% in 1960-1961 to 61% in 1971-1972). 
In 1971, the percentages for the major items of import of Japan from U. S. A. in the 
total import are as follows: wheat (52%), corn (56%), kaoliang (43%), soy beans (91%), 
scrap iron (70%), lumber (27%), coal (51%), business machines and instruments (59%), 
metal processing machines (35%) and aircrafts (99%). 
Moreover, it is observed that the importance of U. S. A. in the Japanese import is 
now decreasing. This is because U. S. A. themselves are losing their reserve strength for 
export with lower ratio of self-supply on side of materials and with greater degree of 
dependence on other countries (here lies one of the main factors for raising of the 
current serious consciousness of crisis on resource problems in Japan today). However, this 
does not directly mean the decline of role of U. S. A. in the Japanese import of materials. 
According to the customs clearance statistics, the Japanese import in 1970 from Ameri-
can enterprises abroad amounted to 3. 05 billion dollars, accounting for 16. 2% of the total 
amount of the Japanese import. The import from the U. S. mainland in the same year 
amounted to 5. 66 billion dollars (29. 4% of the total import). When these two figures are 
combined, the import related to U. S. A. is as much as 45.6% of the total Japanese 
import. Petroleum is an important item accounting alone for about 60% of the total im-
port from American enterprises abroad. In 1970, the total Japanese import of petroleum 
amounted to 2.236 billion dollars, of which the direct import from the U. S. mainland 
being only two million dollars, i.e., O. I % of the total import of petroleum, while the im-
port from American enterprises abroad being I. 824 billion dollars, i.e., 81. 6% of the total 
import of petroleum. It was already mentioned that the greater part of it was produced 
in the Middle East. The total Japanese import of iron are amounted to I. 208 billion 
dollars, of which the import from American enterprises abroad being 528 million dollars 
(43.7%) and the import from the U. S. mainland being 49 million dollars (4.0%). When 
these two figures are combined, the percentage is 47.7% of the total import of iron are. 
As to raw coal, the import from the U. S. mainland amounted much more (63% of the 
total import) than the import from American enterprises abroad being 25%. Both com-
bined, the percentage is 88% of the total import of raw coal. As to copper are, the im-
port from the U. S. mainland accounted for only 1% of the total import, while the im-
port from American enterprises abroad was 36.4%". Here we can not but be conscious 
of international monopolistic bodies led by U. S. A. being in overwhelmingly superior posi-
tion for monopoly-controlled resources at least in the present stage. Truly they impose 
2) Materials supplied by the Research Division of Mitsui Bussan Co. Ltd. See: "Japanese Import 
from the American Enterprises Abroad", Monthly Bulletin of the Federation of Economic 
Organizations, Japan (in Japanese), Nov. 1971. 
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Table 21. Ratio of Import of Major Agricultural Product, 



























The White Paper on Trade and Commerce (in Japanese) j 
referred from Ino, Ryuichi, Open S)'stem and Japanese 
Agriculture (in japane,e), 1969, p.148. 
. 
principal restrictions on the very fundamental conditions of production in Japan. 
7 
Though it is self-explanatory that the monopoly for mineral product resources is much 
stronger than that for agricultural product resources, it should be noted that the aforemen-
tioned change in the structure of imported resources caused the constitution of Japanese 
import of resources to be subject to greater restrictions from the international monopolistic 
bodies led by· U. S. A. The birth of resources nationalism in developing countries will 
eventually reform such a structure but it still belongs to the future. Moreover, even m 
such a situation it is ·clear that it will not directly help stabilize the Japanese import of 
resources. 
The import of machinery was mainly composed of metal processing machines and so 
on in 1960 due to our relatively inferior level of mechanical techniques and to the active 
plant and equipment investment. Since then, with the improvement of technological level 
(chiefly by means of introduction of foreign techniques and imported machinery), the 
domestic production advanced and reduced the importance of U. S. A. Recently, however, 
the import of mac hinery, such as large-scale electronic computers, which pertains to the 
circulation and management process of industries, that of industrial machines for introduc-
ing up-to-date techniques, and that of aircrafts, increased rapidly, and it is enhancing 
the importance of U. S. A. Thus, though the Japanese export towards U. S. A. has followed 
the course of heavy and chemical industrialization and of horizontal division of labor, raw 
materials which constitute a basic condition of process of production, as well as machines 
and techniques which are the core of process of production, are still being introduced. This 
is able to confirm the fact that tbe traditional economic foundation itself of the Japanese 
capitalism which is dependent on, or subordinate to, U. S. A. has not yet been changed. 
The tendency of excess Japanese exports over imports will give rise to strong pro-
tectionism in U. S. A. on one band, and strong demands for liberalization of Japanese 
trade on tbe other. It will enevitably urge the Japanese capitalism to avoid frictions and in-
stability whicb willarise from tbe market conditions. In addition, tbe birth of the resources 
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problems within U. S. A. herself, or her lower ratio of self-supply, will threaten the very 
conditions of reproduction for the enlargement of the Japanese capitalism dependent on 
overseas for most resources. The enlargement of loans, (in the form of reparations prior 
to this period), aids, or capital intrusion mainly directed for Southeast Asia since 1965, 
above all since 1968, is an expression of the correspondence or a full-scale start of organ· 
izing a structure for such a situation. This is a correspondence in a dimention different 
from that of the campaign for market conversion under the chronical excess of imports 
over exports or the dollar shortage. Yet it was in itself connected with the tendency to 
increase in the accumulation of foreign currency or the increase in surplus power of capi. 
tal export which was supported by the Vietnam special procurement and it was also 
backed up by the need to replace U. S. A. in aids. 
2. Southeastern Asian Markets 
The shut-out from the Chinese market after the loss of neighboring markets in the 
postwar period and the dependence on American market made the Japanese capitalism 
decide to direct towards the intrusion into the Southeastern Asian markets which have tradi· 
tionally geographical convenience. 
It was not only combined with the need to secure a market bloc for traditional light 
industrial products and relatively inferior heavy and chemical industrial products, but also 
with the need to alleviate the then overwhelming dependence on import from U. S. A., 
or the chronical dollar shortage (so-called market conversion) and further with the need 
to look for stable markets for raw materials. The American policy of blockade against 
China (it was in a way a re-emergence of the Sino (China) - Japanese alienation policy, 
one of one-time those English traditional diplomatic policies towards East Asia), to which 
Japan had to be subject, forced Japan to seek her allowance for raw materials in still 
more remote places, and this continuously put pressure upon her international balance of 
payments, through the substantial red figures in income from marine transportation. 
Moreover, import capacity of these Southeastern Asian countries was limited because of 
stagnant demand for primary products except petroleum, inferior ability of the regions to 
develop themselves and capital shortage in the postwar period. As was already mentioned, 
the export towards these regions had to enlarge taking advantage of a political tension in 
Asia, being dependent on the American aids, or dollar scattering, arisen thereof. 
Also it is pointed out that Japan has frailty on her material base, and in finding a 
solution for this frailty, Japan always had the American economic power in mind and 
continued to assume the posture to depend on American aids, as is observed in the con· 
ception of Southeastern Asian development by drawing in American capital, which had been 
advocated since the Korean War, and in the conception of utilizing the GARIOA and 
EROA Aids Refundment Funds for Southeastern Asian development. The problems on need 
to secure, or develop, stable supply of materials, or in other wurd::;, on need of overseas 
investment, were brought up by the iron and steel industry as early as the beginning of 
the Korean War, and it was in itself carried out with the help of American capital as a 
link in the chain of Japan-U. S. economic cooperation. It must be noted that the so-
called movement to convert from the American market itself was not undertaken with a 
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vIew to becoming independent on U. S. A. and that it was given by changing the Ameri-
can policy towards Japan so as to strengthen the Japanese iron and steel industry with the 
cooperation of U. S. A." 
At the initial period (1955) of the high growth, more than half of the Japanese ex-
port towards Southeastern Asian markets was filled with light industrial products mainly COID-
posed of textile and miscellaneous goods, while heavy and chemical industrial products 
remained less than 40%. It is not before 1958 that heavy and chemical industrial products 
outnumbered light industrial products in percentage in the export towards these regions. 
If substantial light industrial products which are classified conveniently from a statistical 
point of view into the item of "miscellaneous" are included, it is not until 1960 that heavy 
and chemical industrial products substantially exceeded light industrial products in volume. 
In 1960 the export of heavy and chemical industrial products towards these regions 
increased by 43% from the level of the previous year, and the percentage of these prod-
ucts in export increased to 55%. This increase was brought about by the marked increase 
of export of iron and steel, automobiles and ships. Among them, the increase of export of 
automobiles was due to the special procurement of the American Army Procurement 
Agency and the increase of export of ships resulted from the concentration of time of 
delivery of ships as reparation and subsequent economic aids to the Philippines. 
These changes were concurrent with the reparation to these regions beginning with 
that to Burma in 1955, economic cooperation without compensation or donation, enlarge-
ment of export on deferred payments, initiation of official loans or official yen credit 
beginning in 1958, and the process of enlargement of aids through establishment of the 
Overseas Cooperation Fund. In the course of these processes, the hitherto inferior heavy 
and chemical industry has much more come to be established as an export industry (it is 
well known that the price of plants exported in such a completely tied loan or on defer-
red payments was unreasonably much higher than the international price). 
Taking the intensification of the Vietnam War as an opportunity, the Japanese export 
enlarged further. It was in combination not only with the Vietnam special procurement 
but also with the escalation of overseas investment and aids by Japan herself replacing 
Great Britain as a partner of U. S. A. Especially during this period export related to the 
Vietnam special procurement towards the neighboring seven countries (e.g., the Republic 
of Korea, Formosa and the Philippines and so on) in creased rapidly and the ratio of 
theses even countries in the total Japanese export increased from 16.8% in 1964 to 21% in 
1967. The ratio in the export of heavy and chemical industrial products to Southeast Asia as 
a whole increased from 57% in 1960 to 65% in 1965 and to 67.3% in 1967 (readers may 
note in comparison with these figures that the ratio of heavy and chemical industrialization 
in the export towards U. S. A. was 55%). 
In addition, machinery accounted for 70% of the export of these heavy and chemical 
industrial products and the main body was composed of general industrial machines and 
3) See: One, K., "Raw Materials Problems of Japanese Capitalism", The Economic Review (in 
Japanese), Sept. 1961. 
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Table 22. Regional Composition of Export of Machinery by Main Kinds (1969) 
Television sets 







Light electrical machinery 
Optical machinery 
Heavy electrical machinery 
Total 
INorth America (A) I 
I 79.0 





































Ohuchi, Tsutomu, ed., Modern Japanese Economy (in Japanese), 1971, p.72. 
















plants. The main force was more of heavy machine equipments than of light machines, 
but this is not so in the export towards U. S. A. (see Table 22). We may not need to 
point out again but this process meant a new evolution and development of the struggle 
for market redistribution by japan in Southeast Asia. 
The enlargement of japanese export was, in other words, the enlargement of import 
from japan in these regions. The import from japan increased from 1796 in 1965 to 25% 
in 1969. Since 1968 the import from japan has exceeded that from U. S. A. ranking in 
the first place (see Table 23). 
As to the import from Southeast Asia, on the other hand, the ratio of foodstuff's had 
been fairly high (about 25%) in the import till the middle of the 1960's but raw materi-
als and fuel accounted for 70% in the later half of the 1960's, while the ratio of food-
stuff's declined to 1496 (see Table 24-A, B). 
However, the japanese trade with Southeast Asia has been lowering its share both in 
export and in import since the beginning of the 1960's. With a few exceptions the balance 
of trade has generally showed chronic excess of japanese exports over imports and the width 
of excess is bigger than the amount of japanese investment or aids. Especially the widths 
of red figures of the countries without resources like the Republic of Korea, Formosa, 
South Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand and so on, are enormous. From 1968 to 1970, 
the export towards the regions of Southeast Asia rather lowered its share from 34% in 1960 
to 25% in [970.. On the other hand, the increase of import from these regions during 
this period exceeded the increased of the total import (21%) with the result that the per-
centage in the import incd:ased approximately by one point (16%). However, it did not 
reach the level of the beginning of the 1960's (22%). It implies that, in spite of the 
increase of aids, export on deferred payments, loans or investments both by U. S. A. and 
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Table 23. Shares of Japan, Great Britain and U. S. A. in Imports of Southeastern 





U.S.A. I Great Britain 
-"" 
1961-63 5.5 29.5 17.0 




36.8 17. I 
Pakistan 
1968 I I. 0 I 30.2 12.2 
1961-63 9.0 3.4 20. 7 
Ceylon 
1968 5.2 7.9 15.6 
1964-67 I 27.5 11.2 3.4 
Indonesia ! 1968 I 23.1 26. 7 2.3 
._ .. -
1964-67 I 16.6 7.4 19. 1 Malay and Singapore 
1968 i 21. 7 10.7 14.8 
I 
1961-63 17. 7 44.1 I 4.6 , 




1961-63 30. 7 I 16.5 9.3 Thailand 




14.9 1961-63 5.0 
I 
Burma 
1968 23.6 4. 7 14.5 
, I 





1968 30.0 29.3 , 1.2 I 






40.4 26. 7 1.8 
. -_ ... 
The Republic of Korea 1961-63 26.6 
I 
50.0 1.3 




1961-63 16.0 11. 5 11. 9 
1968 21. 8 13.9 8. 7 
1961-63 
I 
5.9 20.8 30. 1 
Australia 
1968 10.8 26.4 22. 1 
1961-63 
I 
3.8 9.3 42.2 
New Zealand 1968 7.7 I 12.2 31. 4 
Note the decline of the position of Great Britain in the areas of the British Cammonwenlth 
of Nations. Also note that in a case of viewing from Japan the share in the Japanese 
export is at most around 3% even for the countries with especially high percentages. 




Table 24-A. Japanese Import from Southeast Asia (Unit: %) 
I 1965 I 1968 I 1970 
Foodstuffs 25.5 19.2 14.8 
Fabric raw materials 5. I 3. 7 3.3 
Raw metallic materials 23.9 21.1 19.4 
Other raw materials 30.6 32.6 30.5 
Mineral fuels 7.9 II. 3 , 15.7 ! 
Processed products 6.6 II. 4 : 15.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 : 100.0 
I 
.. The Whzte Paper on Trade and Commerce (m Japanese), edItions 
for respective years. 
Table 24-B. Japanese Import of Primary Products and Southeast Asia (1968) 
Ratio of import from 
Southeast Asia Major supplying countries 
Corn (livestock feed) 16% Thailand 
Raw cotton 7 Pakistan, India 
Iron ore 28 India. Malay 
Scrap iron 11 India 
Bauxite ore 53 Indonesia 
Copper ore 32 Philippines 
Nickel 5 Indonesia 
Salt 14 India 
Natural rubber 97 Malay, Thailand 
Copra 80 Indonesia, Philippines 
Coal 
Crude oil 8 Indonesia 
Lumber 39 Philippines, Malay 
Yukiz3wa, Kenzo, ed.,Japanese Economy and Asia (in Japanese), 1970, p.134. 
Japan, the effectiveness of these markets as the markets for sales or for matenals in the 
process of enlargement of the Japanese economy is extremely restricted. Fundamentally, 
this extremely restricted effectiveness may be prescribed by the political instability in these 
regions, by the change in the structure of demand for primary products, especially by the 
stagnant export of Asian primary products. We should also note that it is restricted in a 
way by the American export of foods as aids. In this sense, recent Japanese aids of foods 
towards these regions assume the same character. 
Recently, however, a change in the import from Southeast Asia has been observed and 
it should be paid attention to. The change is that light industrial products increased the 
ratio in the Japanese import from these regions (see Table 25). 
The percentage of light industrial products in the import from Southeast Asia increas-
ed from 6.6% in 1965 to II. 4% in 1968, and to 15.4% in 1970. In addition, heavy and 
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Table 25. Ratio of Import from Southeast Asia and the Growth Rate (1970) 
I Share of Southeast 
Asia in import 
I Averafe annual growth 
; rate 0 1968-70 
Total import 16.0% 23.0 
Foodstuffs 17.4 8.3 
Fish and shellfish 49.3 38.5 
Raw fuels 19.6 23.2 
Mineral fuels 12. I 45.0 
Lumber 45.6 20.5 
Heavy and chemical industrial products 4. 7 29. 7 
Non-ferrous metals II. 3 24. 7 
Semi-conductor elements 14.0 100.8 
Light industrial products 23.8 58.8 
Wooden products (ex. f urnitures) 38.5 276.2 
Textile products 41. 5 49.4 
(Thread) 58.4 27.0 
(Cotton textile) 43.6 76. 7 
(Silk textile) 70.3 36.0 
(Clothing) 55.6 129.3 
Other miscellaneous products 10.5 77. 7 
(Furnitures) 14.6 82.6 
(Articles for travel, bags) 33.9 73.2 
(Toys and amusement goods) 7.3 56.0 
(Artificial flowers) 98.4 , 32.9 
The While Paper on Trade and Commerce (in Japanese), 1971. 
chemical industrial parts like semi-conductor elements, appeared among the imported prod-
ucts. They are mainly composed of labor-intensive products like textile, miscellaneous goods, 
light machines and so on, with the Republic of Korea, Formosa and Hong Kong being their 
main producer-countries. The intrusion of these commodities based on abundant cheap labor 
in those developing countries will inevitably have a certain effect on the producers in japan, 
namely smaller enterprises who bear most of the production, with weak management bases 
and high degree of dependence on export. It was already mentioned that the position of japan 
declined in the competition not only in the japanese market but also in the American 
market. It can be safely said that this tendency will possibly continue to have a greater 
effect helped by the preferential duties granted by developed countries by liberalization of 
the japanese import and by enlargement of the frame of the japanese preferential duties. 
Owing to the decline of the Vietnam special procurement, export pressure on japan 
from these regions will enevitably become stronger unless japan herself finances the chronic 
red figures of these regions Coffsetting by investments and aids) in this occasion. In addi-
tion, transfer of production bases to Southeast Asia as a self-adjustment to these situations, 
that is intrusion through capital export or subcontracting, is expected to advance further. 
The reality has already largely been heading towards the direction, and the aforementioned 
increase of import itself is in a way nothing but a consequence of the japanese intrusion. 
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The existence of the gap between export and import, which arises from inferiority of 
import from these regions against enlarged export, is compelled to appear as a pressure on 
the trade towards these regions and to represent itself as a factor to augment much more 
instability in these regions. At the same time, it is obliged to intensify the criticism against 
Japan from these regions, of which recent boycott of Japanese goods in Thailand is an 
example. 
Lastiy, let us explain briefly about Oceania. The British Commonwealth of Nations 
adjacent to East Asia is now being subsumed within the Japan- U. S. A. economic bloc in 
Asia and the Pacific in proportion to the decline of English influence in Asia (as is demon-
strated in the dispatch of troops to South Vietnam by Australia and New Zealand). The 
collapse of the old sterling bloc, or the weakening of the relation with suzerain Great 
Britain, went on rapidly in the postwar Asia since the latter half of the 1950's. It was also 
concurrent with the course along which Australia has become more and more the base 
that supplies Japan with materials (it is also premised on the joint investment for develop-
ment by Japanese and American capitals). 
The increased percentage of Australia in the Japanese import demonstrates the above 
fact. The country has come to be more important as a provider of mineral materials 
mainly of raw coal and iron ore, besides the traditional wool. Thus Japan is suffering from 
substantial red figures in the trade with Australia. In 1970, Southeast Asia and Oceania 
together grew up to be as big a market as the American market, with the Japanese export 
being 30% and the import 26%. 
3. Socialist Markets 
After the war, many authors cited before included socialist markets, above all, the 
Chinese market, as one of the major link of trade of Japan. However, the argument can 
not have been based on the assumption that these markets had really functioned as an 
indispensable link in the postwar process of enlargement of the Japanese capitalism. This 
is because the ratio of these markets remained coherently low both in quality and quantity 
under the regulation of COCOM, or especially under the control of the American policy of 
blockade against China. In 1971 when the list of articles under the embargo was drastically 
relaxed, the percentages for these markets still remained 4.8%, respectively, both in 
the total export and in the import (however, Japan took the second place next to West 
Germany in the trade with socialist countries and the first place in the trade with China). 
Nevertheless, the traditional authors must have regarded these markets as important, 
in the meaning showing a contradiction being that the markets have a new character 
and a possibility for development, but, that, in their turn, they are deprived of the possibility 
and rather are now under restriction. The contradiction that the trade taking advantage 
of adjacent markets, the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea has been 
under restriction was the very large factor to prescribe internationally the postwar Japanese 
reproduction. It also expressed clearly in the international setting the nature of the 
Japanese economy which, incorporated as a link of a chain of anti-communism military 
setup in Asia, and accomplished growth by following it faithfully. However, for the progress 
of heavy and chemical industrialization itself, non-discriminative enlargement is required 
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constantly as an economic logic and above all the intrusion into the Chinese market was 
intended, though it still remains to be a supplementary market to capitalist markets. 
With a comeback to the United Nations by China in October of 1971, subsequent visits 
to China by R. M. Nixon, the President of the United States of America in February of 1972 
and by K. Tanaka, the Prime Minister of Japan in September of the same year, as a 
turning point, the trade between Japan and China is coming into a new stage. However, 
it will depend on the course of confrontation between China and U.S.S.R. and on the basic 
posture of the Japanese capitalism itself whether or not the two countries will become stable 
and reciprocal markets. The visit to China by K. Tanaka was realized only after the visit 
to China by R. M. Nixon and even in the develop ment of Siberia CTyumen oil) joint de-
velopment by Japan with U. S. A. was intended. These facts express clearly in themselves 
the Japan's self-regulation, or subordination to restriction, in this market". 
Lastly, let us explain briefly the postwar international balance of payments of Japan. 
IV Postwar International Balance of Payments of Japan 
During the period of recovery from the postwar desolation (1946-1950), the export 
was not half as much as the import. Owing to the demolition of the mercantile marine, 
transportation also suffered from unfavoraole balance of payments. What supplemented the 
Table 26. Transition of International Balance of Payments after the War 
(Unit: million dollars) 
I i I I J 946-50: 1951-551 1956-6011961-6411965-68 1969 
I 
1970 i average! average I average _ average average I 
--
, 
23! o 5731 760! 2,044 2,349 Balance of current account 145 105 
Balance of trade i 6 188 6 393 93 14 1, 9661 3,718 4,439 
, 
Export i 395 1,507 3,116 5,276 1O,239! 16,479 19,855 
Import I 583 1,900 3,023 5,263 8,273' 12, 761 15,416 I Balance of invisible trade I o 68 442 o 161 " 539 6 1,062 6 1,487 " 1,861 
Balance of transfer account 401 55 d4
1 
o 47 " 143 6 187 " 229 I 
Balance oflong-term capital account' o 16i 15 28' 184 o 569
1 
0 642 6 1,347 
o 201 " 221 
I 
Domestic capital o 97j 6 343
1 
o 781 0 1,892 0 2,010 
2121 1,250 i 663 Foreign capital 4' 37 126, 527
1 129 1 
i 
51 1 (Basic balance of pnyments) 120 389, 1921 1,402 i 1,002 
I i I I Balance of short-term capital , , 1171 370 ! 670 - 22' /:;. 1 i 1481 account ! 
11 2s1 
, 
Errors and unaccountable , 15i 201 022
1 
2171 327 , ~ 2511 Total balance , 145' 143: 78 318 1,9B9 1 1,999 
, I 
The average amounts until 1968 are taken from The Economic White Paper (in Japanese), 
1969. Basic materials are taken from the Bank of Japan, Table of International Balance of 
Payments (in Japanese). 
4) Refer in detail on the trade between Japan and China to : Okamoto, SabuTa, The TheM)1 on 
Trade between Japan and China (in Japanese), 1971. 
16 K.ONO 
deficit was the favorable balance of transfer account, i. e., the GARIOA and EROA 
Funds, or American aids to Japan. The postwar process of recovery of reproduction got 
started here, and that decided the subsequent direction of Japan. During the period from 
1951 to 1955, both export and import increased. However, the excess of imports over exports 
was enormous, and uninterruptedly the payments in transportation, insurance and others in-
creased. What replaced the aforementioned aids in relieving the international balance of 
payments in this stage was the income from special procurement amounted to 700 million 
dollars annually succeeding to the Korean War special procurement, which is contained in 
balance of invisible trade. Recovery to or breaking the prewar level of production and 
process of expansion of the basic industries went along with the process of establishment 
of the bases for heavy and chemical industrialization, and this process was also supported 
by the special procurement in connection with the American policy to Asia. 
During the period of high growth (1955-1960), balance of trade approached an equi-
librium, while red figures in incomes from transportation and investments which are 
held in balance of invisible trade increased. On one hand, balance of transfer account 
also suffered from deficit with the beginning of the payment of reparation. One factor 
which supplemented these deficits was the special procurements as it was before. On the 
other hand, an increasing tendency in inflow of capital should be noticed. As to the peri-
od from 1961 to 1964 when the dollar crisis became more serious and when liberalization 
of trade started and proceeded, the basic condition of balance of trade was similar to that 
in the previous period, while, in the invisible trade, payment for international investment 
income and for equivalent of introduction of techniques and so on, as well as the payment 
in transportation and insurance, increased markedly. In addition, special procurement was 
reduced to a half of the previous period (300 million dollars levell, with the result that 
substantial deficit was incurred. As a whole the balance of current account was reversed 
from that of the previous period and it suffered from an enormous deficit. What relieved 
this deficit was the inflows of long-term and of short-term capitals. The period, in which 
advancement in industrial structure was realized and plant and equipment investment in-
creased markedly, that is to say, the period of establishment of heavy and chemical indus-
trialization were indeed made possible with inflows of long-term and of short-term capitals 
in this period chiefly from U. S. A. 
In the above process, cyclical fluctuation was disregarded and during the period 
Japan experienced three occasions of the monetary restraints owing to foreign capital 
crises. The years of 1953-1954, 1957,1961 and 1964 are the examples. They all arose from 
the expansion of import induced by the process of excess expansion of economy or of 
capital accumulation, and in every time adjustment through policies for monetary restraint. 
was carried out. In these periods, the so-called "wall of international balance of payments" 
became an issue as a factor that retards the growth. This trend is explicit in that the 
foreign currency reserves of Japan had little by little amounted to I. 8 billion dollars 
in the 1960's, but for all that, they tended to decrease gradually since then (see Table 
27). Hence also, the supreme emphasis on export expansion as a greatest factor to get rid 
of this wall and to support a continued growth formed a public opinion. (We should 
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Table 27. Transition of Foreign Currency Reserves 
(Unit: million dollars) 
]Foreign currency CD 
I 
Gold ® i (i)+® , 
1955 746 23 769 
60 1,577 247 1,824 
65 1,569 328 1,897 
66 1,469 329 1,798 
67 1,453 338 1,792 
68 2,261 356 2,617 
69 2,614 413 3,028 
70 
I 
3, 188 532 3, 720 
71 13,783 679 14,521 
IMF, International Financial Statistics. The ratio of gold reserves in gold 
and foreign currency reserves in 1971 was 5.1% and it is the lowest 
among the developed countries. Foreign currency does not include 
IMF gold tranche and SDR. 
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also bear in mind that Okinawa which was seperated from japan in the postwar period 
brought always japan proper enormous amount of dollar income, at the least more than 
one to three hundred million dollars annually throughout the 1960's.) 
As to the period from 1965 of the Vietnam War to 1968, deficit in the balance of 
invisible trade augmented further and deficit in the balance of transfer account also 
augmented with an increasing trend of aids to Southeast Asia (reparation and aids without 
compensation). However, the balance of current account went into the large black be-
cause of that the substantial black-ink came about in the balance of trade. And the 
international balance of payments as a whole was also went into the black in spite of the 
enlargement of deficit in balance of capital account due to the increase of long-term 
capital export. Foreign currency reserves was also increasing with a bottom in 1967 and 
in 1968 it finally reached the level of 2. 0 billion dollars. Both in 1969 and 1970 the defi-
cit in the balance of invisible trade continued to enlarge and capital investment also m-
creased drastically bringing about a substantial deficit. However, the black-ink came to 
arise in the balance of trade and it was enough to cover these deficits. This is what we 
call conversion or fixing to the basic condition in the black. In 1971 the foreign currency 
reserves increased drastically to the annual amount of 10.0 billion dollars with the move-
ment of short-term capital. Recently (February 1973) the reserves is reported to be 
virtually more than 20. 0 billion dollars. It goes without saying that such a change after 
1965 was supported by the strengthened competitive power in export of the japanese 
heavy and chemical industries which had been reserved in the previous period. Neverthe-
less, as was mentioned earlier, we should pay attention to the fact that the change was 
concurrent with the intensification of the Vietnam War. We should also note that the rate 
of foreign exchange had been fixed until the end of 1971 and that it had been supported 
by the expansion of the credit of the Bank of japan in spite of the augmented black-ink 
figures in the international balance of payments and of the increased foreign currency 
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holdings (from 1968 to 1971 the ratio of overseas assets increased markedly in the assets 
of the Bank of Japan and it became the primary factor of the expansion of the credit of 
the Bank of Japan). In the long run, this means that the rate of foreign exchange which 
should have rised in accordance with the economic law, was placed practically in a lower 
position by supporting dollars with the credit of the Bank of Japan. In this viewpoint, it 
will be able to say that the expansion of export was performed through a forced mainte-
nance of the low exchange policies (exchange dumping). This process which intensified 
inflation within the country was in a way the very process to propel strongly expansion of 
export or transformation of heavy and chemical industries into export industries. 
It not only made pollution problems nationwide but also was a process, which invited 
from the western countries a stronger criticism of "pollution dumping" (it was in the sense 
that enterprises failed to bear the expenses to relieve pollution) as a new type of dumping 
from Japan. It was also the very process to enlarge and strengthen both internationally 
and nationally contradictions of the heavy and chemical industrialization of Japan. 
Conclusion 
When we say that the position of Japan in the world underwent a big change in the 
course after 1965, let us confirm the fact not only in her foreign trade and in her inter-
national balance of payments but also in her international indebtedness (balance of loans 
and debts) (see Table 28). 
In 1967 long-term assets (overseas long-term investments) exceeded long-term debts 
in the international indebtedness of Japan, and in 1969 Japan became a creditor-country 
both in long-term and short-term assets. Since then, the width of excessed assets gradually 
expanded and in 1971 it doubled in a jump (ten times as much as that of 1968). By the 
end of November 1972, excess assets had increased by 48% from the level of the end of 
1971, amounting to 19.766 billion dollars. The amount was drawing near to the level of 
20.0 billion dollars and Japan has come to establish her position as a creditor-country. The 
aids to the developing countries amounted to 2. I billion dollars in 1971, which is in the 
second place in the world next to U. S. A. with 7.0 billion dollars. 
However, a conspicuous characteristics in the balance of international indebtedness of 
Japan is that, in assets, the short-term assets (foreign currency reserves which increased 
explosively over a short period being the main portion) had a greater ratio than the long-
term assets by a difference of 10.0 billion dollars. This practically means that Japan con-
trolled the intensification of inflation in U. S. A. from this aspect, and that it financed a 
part of the Vietnam War and of the capital export from U. S. A. The ratio of direct 
investment in long-term assets is still low and even if the direct investment increased, it is 
no more than 2. 6 billion dollars, which is far below the level of investment in the prewar 
period (the loss of assets by corporations at the end of the war is estimated to be 16.6 
billion dollars). Its level is much lower than the level of U. S. A. and that of Great 
Britain, which was respectively 70.8 and 18.6 billion dollars in their balances of investment 
in the end of 1969. Increased short-term assets included enormous short-term capital be-
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Table 28. Balance of International Indebtedness of Japan, i. e., Foreign 
Loans and Debts (Unit: million dollars) 
I 1965 I 1967 I 1968 I 1971 I 1972 I , 
Assets I I I Long-term assets 2,503 4,085 I 5, 168 ll,200 15,278 
Direct investment 639 866 1,087 2,050 2,619 
Export on deferred payments 1,315 2,200 2, 775 5,300 5,577 
Yen credit 287 655 893 2,450 3,859 
Others 262 361 413 1,400 3,223 
Short-term assets 4,697 5, 196 
! 
6,827 20,515 26, 798 
Assets of foreign exchange banks 2,549 3,105 : 3,828 5,200 8,302 
(export usance) (1,652) (I, 982) (2, 734) (3,800) (3,222) 
Others 41 86 108 80 84 , 
Foreign currency reserves 2,107 2,005 2,891 
I 
15,235 18,412 






Long-term debts 3,927 , 3,880 4,717 I 7,540 8, 117 , 
I 
Direct investment 522 : 598 I 651 1,050 I, 195 I 
External debts 708 669 789 1,070 954 
Loan 1,915 
, 
1,925 2,403 I 2,670 2,508 
Securities investment 231 
, 
275 504 I 2,450 3, 159 
, 
Import on clef erred payments 167 94 81 ! 100 107 I 
GARIOA, EROA 389 319 289 200 194 
Short-term de bts 4,404 5,600 6,267 I 10,800 14, 193 
I Government and Bank of Japan 1 338 362 354 500 596 
-Foreign exchange banks 
I 
3,452 4, 133 4,617 6,800 8, 14i 
(Import usance) (2,035) (2,211) (2,302) (2,500) (1,430) 
Others i 614 
I 





8,331 9,480 10,984 18,340 22,310 I 
Net asset balance I 6 1,131 I 6 119 I 1,011 I 13,375 I 19,766 , 
Japan EconomIC Newspaper (10 Japanese), March 15 and July 25, 1969 and Jan. 17, 1973. 
Figures are based on the research of major foreign exchange banks at the end of respective 
years, except for 1972 where the figure at the end of November are shown. 
cause of uncertainty over currency, and not that the stability as an assets had not been 
secured. It is true that in the foreign currency reserves in Japan ranks the second in the 
world next to West Germany but the ratio of gold in composition of assets is overwhelm-
ingly low (5%). In this sense, Japan has a greater instability than other developed 
countries. 
Presently, the average ratio of gold in the reserves of gold and of foreign currency is 
about 30% throughout the world, but the ratio of Japan's gold holdings is below the 
average, lower than that of a developing countries such as the Philippines and so On. The 
weakness in the composition of gold holdings may be brought about either because Japan 
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did not demand the exchange of holding dollars into gold as a faithful cooperator in 
defending dollars or because she had the exchange controlled. This also expresses the 
frailty of her position in general as a creditor-country. Because of the depreciation of 
dollar, the fall in the real value of foreign currency reserves of Japan came to have the 
honour of being the highest in the world. It was a complete transfer of value to U. S. A. 
without compensation. 
What is called the Smithsonian system once established in 1971 has already collapsed 
in the present time and the transition of the world economy from fixed exchange rate 
system into floating exchange rate system is now decisive (in February 1973, the re-devalua-
tion of dollar by 10% was done, the transition of Japanese yen into floating exchange 
rate system came into force, and the revaluation of yen took effect after March the float-
ing exchange rate system came to stay also in Europe). Internationally Japan is no longer 
allowed to keep the fixed exchange rate system or the low exchange policies which has 
supported the expansion of her export, and the competitive power in her export is now 
facing a serious threat also from this aspect. What with the intensification of inflation 
within the country and what with the pressure on the competitive power in export from 
foreIgn exchange, Japan is gradually expanding the overseas processing bases, and will have 
to expand much more hereafter her investment for developing resources as global problems 
of resources become more serious. At least until now, in spite of the increased investment 
for developing reSOurces since 1965, the degree of dependence in major resources on for-
eign countries has not yet been liquidated or relieved by it at all. On the contrary, the 
degree of dependence has meanwhile been increasing. It is not yet clear how the process 
of expansion or the process of internationalization of the Japanese economy will affect her 
international balance of payments. 
What is clear enough to be pointed out, however, is that it will become the process 
which will further augment frictions with U. S. A. and that at the same time it will be-
come the process which will further intensify repulsion from Southeast Asia. For, in the 
case of Japan, combination with Southeastern Asian market bloc may expand a control over 
market bloc by Japan in trade and in investment, but it may not necessarily be combined 
with economic independence or industrialization of the other countries. On the contrary, 
greater dependence on Japan will definitely tend to have the aspects to control independ-
ence or industrialization (control over markets and expropriation of resources). 
At the same time, it is also sure that it will be not the process which will certainly 
neither relieve inflation or raising of prices within the country (even if advancement and 
pressure of the open system should bring about increased import), nor lead to the process 
dissolving the low wages in Japan herself. 
Since Japan depends on import of resources largely controlled by the international 
monopolistic bodies, raising of rate of foreign exchange tends also to induce subsequent 
raising of import price. On the other hand, because of the circumstances aforementioned, 
the possibility to overlay export price with an increase from raised exchange rate is limited 
especially in export to developed countries. Consequently, a tendency which will not lead 
to more advantageous terms of trade functions strongly. And, in the course of such pro-
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cesses, the situation will probably be opened unexpectedly early when the so-called "con-
stant black-ink balance theory" itself will have to be revised. 
